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Abstract In the past 150 years there have been many attempts to draw parallels
between cultural and biological evolution. Most of these attempts were flawed due to
lack of knowledge and false ideas about evolution. In recent decades these short-
comings have been cleared away, thus triggering a renewed interest in the subject.
This paper offers a critical survey of the main issues and arguments in that discussion.
The paper starts with an explication of the Darwinian algorithm of evolution. It is
argued that this ‘formula’ is substrate-neutral, which means that biological evolution
might not be the only Darwinian process. Other dynamic systems could evolve as
well provided that certain conditions are met. In the case of human culture this seems
to be the case. The paper then focuses on the notion of niche construction. It is argued
that niche construction plays a crucial role in human evolution because it has altered
the sources of natural selection and thus the path of evolution. Next two approaches
to cultural evolution are discussed: sociobiology and memetics. I will argue that both
approaches have flaws because they either underestimate the influence of culture or
they stretch analogies too far. Finally two common objections against the idea of
cultural evolution are addressed: Lamarckian inheritance and the issue of guided
variation. I will argue that although cultural evolution differs from biological evolu-
tion in several respects, these discrepancies do not jeopardize the claim that cultural
evolution is essentially Darwinian.
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The existence of human culture is a deep evolutionary mystery, on a par
with the origins of life itself.
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Introduction
Ever since the publication of The Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man
(1871), people have argued that Darwin’s theory of evolution does not only pertain to
the biological realm of organisms and species but to the realm of human culture as
well. Yet the first attempts to cast culture into a Darwinian framework were somewhat
hazardous because the theory of evolution was still incomplete, and as a result people
held all kinds of erroneous ideas about evolution. The most common mistake was the
widely held belief, propagated by Herbert Spencer (1857) amongst others, that
evolution is linear (instead of treelike), thoroughly progressive, and that the white
European male was the undisputed pinnacle and end point of this process. It was not
until the second half of the 20th century, after the realization of the so-called Modern
Synthesis in biology, that authors like Popper (1972); Toulmin (1972); Campbell
(1974a, b); Wilson (1975); Dawkins (1976); Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981);
Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Hull (1988) resumed the thread by providing models
which tried to explain cultural, technological and scientific change in terms of
Darwinian principles. For the first time, the Neo-Darwinian theory of evolution was
fully deployed in order to understand and explain the development of human culture.1
The idea is roughly as follows. Darwin’s theory can be extended to the cultural
domain, either because culture is considered to be an inextricable part of human
nature, or because cultural change is a process fundamentally similar to biological
evolution. The former approach sees culture as a direct extension of biological
evolution, the latter approach sees culture as a process which is essentially analogous
to biological evolution. Either way, cultural change is seen as a process which obeys
and thus can be described and explained by Darwinian principles. Culture, in short,
can be ‘Darwinized’. Yet over the years, many critics have argued that any attempt to
Darwinize culture is destined to fail because there are just too many obvious differ-
ences between biological evolution on the one hand and cultural change on the other.
Hence culture can neither be a direct extension of biological evolution, nor a process
that is somehow analogous to it. Of course these critics readily admit that culture
‘evolves’ in the sense that culture develops and that it changes over time. But that is
considered a trivial fact, an obvious truth, because there really is not much needed to
meet this condition. It is the stronger claim that these critics object to, the claim that
culture evolves according to Darwinian principles. This claim, they argue, cannot be
upheld because the way in which culture ‘evolves’ is completely different from the
way biological species evolve. After all, biological evolution is a blind and mindless
process whereas cultural evolution is guided by intentional agents. These, and other,
differences between the two processes make any search for direct links or analogies
redundant once and for all.
However, against these critics I shall argue that despite several obvious differences
between the two kinds of evolution, cultural change nevertheless might still be called
‘Darwinian’ because it shares a key feature with biological evolution, viz., both kinds
of evolution are the result of cumulative selection processes. I will argue that
cumulative selection is the distinctive and defining characteristic of Darwinian
evolution. So although many dynamic systems might exhibit directional change over
1 See Buskes (1998).
662 Philosophia (2013) 41:661–691
time – and thus evolve –, only a few of these systems evolve in a true Darwinian
manner. I shall argue that our culture is one of those systems, although culture as a
process obviously deviates from biological evolution in several respects. In the past
some authors have mistakenly assumed that in order to be called ‘Darwinian’, cultural
evolution should be largely similar to biological evolution. Clearly this is not the
case. Analogies must not be stretched too far because both kinds of evolution have
their own characteristics and idiosyncrasies. For instance, the way in which informa-
tion is transmitted in cultural evolution might not entirely correspond with the way in
which information is transmitted in biological evolution. In biological evolution the
flow of information usually is ‘vertical’, when the genetic code is transferred from
parents to offspring, while in cultural evolution the flow of information might be
‘horizontal’ as well, as when cultural information is passed on to contemporaries or
nonrelatives. Yet to my mind cultural evolution might still be called ‘Darwinian’ even
though it differs in several aspects from biological evolution because human culture,
as opposed to animal culture, has the unique ability to accumulate. This means that
information gradually builds up over successive generations resulting in highly
intricate cultural artifacts and practices which never could have been invented from
scratch by a single individual. It is this particular feature that makes cultural change,
like biological evolution, quintessentially Darwinian. Both kinds of evolution, that is,
are characterized by the accumulation of information, resulting in complex adapta-
tions, historical lineages (whether genetic or conceptual), and descent with modifi-
cation. Both genes and culture are informational entities that are differentially
transmitted from one generation to the next.2
Here’s an outline of my argument. In “Darwin’s Formula”, I show how Darwinian
evolution is propelled by what we might call ‘Darwin’s formula’, viz., a three-step
algorithm comprising variation, selection, and replication. I argue that Darwin’s
formula is substrate-neutral, so in principle the algorithm could be working in other
domains – like the realm of culture – as well. In “The Cultural Animal”, I show how
human culture differs from animal culture, and how this difference is caused by the
way in which we gather and transmit information. It is this difference which makes
human culture cumulative. In “Niche Construction and Human Cumulative Culture”,
I argue that the emergence of human culture is closely related to the phenomenon of
niche construction. With the rise of culture, human beings not only have radically
altered their natural environments but the sources of selection in those environments
as well. Thus niche construction alters the path of evolution. In “Nature, Culture, and
Co-evolution” and “Genes, Memes, and Flawed Analogies”, I raise the question
whether culture is a direct extension of biological evolution as is maintained by
sociobiology, or rather a process which is analogous to biological evolution as
adherents of memetics argue. I shall demonstrate that both schools have their flaws
because they either underestimate the influence of culture (sociobiology), or they are
inclined to stretch analogies too far (memetics). In “Culture’s Blind Edge and
Lamarckian Flavors”, finally, I discuss two common objections against the idea of
cultural evolution, i.e., its alleged Lamarckian character and its apparent directedness
(or guided variation). Again I shall argue that cultural evolution indeed differs from
biological evolution in these and other respects, but at the same time I believe that
2 Laland (2002); Mesoudi et al. (2004); Levinson and Jaisson (2006).
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these discrepancies do not undermine my central claim that cultural evolution is
essentially Darwinian.
Darwin’s Formula
It was Darwin’s great merit that he provided an explanation for something that had
baffled scientists and philosophers for centuries: the perplexing diversity and com-
plexity of the living world. Before Darwin, scholars and thinkers had no choice but to
appeal to the supernatural in order to explain the riddle. It was firmly believed that all
species were created by an omnipotent, divine craftsman, someone who thought it all
up, drew the design, and then blew life into it. Yet Darwin demonstrated that the
diversity and complexity of the living world can be explained by a mechanism which
does not appeal to the supernatural or the divine, to wit: evolution. Darwinian
evolution is governed by what we might call ‘Darwin’s formula’. Darwin’s formula
consists of the three elements variation, selection, and replication.3 It is quite a simple
mechanism, but given enough time and successive generations, it can produce truly
awesome effects. Variation, the first element of the formula, might be called the ‘fuel’
of evolution. Variation means that the members of a particular population always
show slight phenotypic differences, for instance in color, in height, or in the way they
are able to cope with disease, etc. Some phenotypic variations are useful while others
are harmful with regard to survival and reproduction. That brings us to the second
element of the formula, selection, which we might call the ‘engine’ of evolution.
Selection means that some individuals are more successful in surviving and repro-
ducing than other individuals. These differences in fitness are generally non-random
because selection is not a blind lottery. On average, the individuals who are best
adapted to their environment will survive and produce the most offspring. Natural
selection is a sieving process which retains useful variations and rejects harmful ones.
Finally, the third and last element of Darwin’s formula, replication, might be called
the ‘key’ of evolution because, in some real sense, it opens the door to immortality.
Not for individual organisms because they eventually will die, but for their genetic
blueprint, their DNA. Through sexual or asexual reproduction, organisms can trans-
mit their genetic makeup to the next generation, over and over again, and this makes
their DNAvirtually indestructible. In fact, some genes in our bodies are so old that we
share them with insects, flatworms, and yeast. Moreover, replication also entails that
the sieving process becomes cumulative in character. In the course of many gen-
erations, useful traits will be enhanced whereas harmful traits will gradually
disappear. Again, this means that cumulative selection is quintessentially a non-
random process. After all, cumulative selection is no single, haphazard event. On
the contrary, cumulative selection is a process in which the results of one sieving
process are fed into a subsequent sieving, and so on, ad infinitum. The evolving
‘entities’ are thus subjected to sorting over many ‘generations’ in succession,
thereby giving a direction to evolution. In the biological realm such cumulative
sieving mechanisms result in the countless examples of complex design, func-
tional adaptation, and the seemingly miraculous instances of fit between organism
and environment.
3 See Lewontin (1970).
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In sum, Darwinian evolution is a cumulative sieving process in which the output of
every selection cycle serves as input for the next cycle, and so on. As a result the
makeup of the population will gradually change over time, and the longer the sorting
process will last, the more unpredictable the result will be. Over millions of years and
many successive generations, the original population might well have turned into
something completely new. The strength and creativity of cumulative selection
processes should therefore not be underestimated. Such processes might look rather
clumsy and wasteful, but yet they are able to produce genuine novelty, increased
organization, and stunning examples of fit. Or as Sperber (1996) put it: ‘Darwinian
selection is one of intellectual history’s most powerful tools.’4
It is now easy to see that if in some dynamic system one or two of the aforemen-
tioned ingredients are missing, no Darwinian evolution will occur. As a example of
such a non-cumulative selection mechanism, consider the solar system.5 Our solar
system consists of our star, the sun, and a number of satellites comprising solid
planets, gaseous planets, dwarf planets, asteroids, comets, and so on. These satellites
display ample variation in size, composition, mass, distance to the sun, orbital
velocity, etc. Under the influence of the sun’s gravitational pull – our selection force
– a real struggle for existence must have taken place, for only those satellites survived
whose orbital velocity and distance to the sun were in perfect balance. Otherwise
sooner or later a satellite would either have crashed into the sun, collided with another
satellite, or vanished into deep space. So the current relatively stable constellation of
our solar system is the result of an elementary selection or sorting process. Moreover,
one can even say that the solar system has evolved. But note that the solar system did
not evolve according to Darwinian principles! Granted, there is variation and there is
selection, but the third essential ingredient for the Darwinian recipe is missing:
replication. Celestial bodies cannot reproduce themselves, and without the cumula-
tive effect of replication no complex and functional designs will emerge. In short,
there are a lot of dynamic systems which evolve, yet only in those dynamic systems
in which all three essential ingredients are present will Darwinian evolution and
hence cumulative selection occur. The question we now have to answer is: might
human culture be such a system?
It is important to note that Darwin’s formula is not necessarily confined to the
narrow context of biology. As Lewontin (1970) already noticed, the generality of the
principle of evolution means that any dynamic system that has variation, selection
and replication may evolve. This idea, subsequently taken up by Dawkins (1976,
1982) and Dennett (1995) amongst others, is that Darwin’s formula is ‘substrate
neutral’, a doctrine also known as ‘Universal Darwinism’. This means that the
algorithm is neutral with respect to the medium or substrate of evolution, and neutral
with respect to the ‘entities’ that evolve. So in principle any dynamic system could
evolve according to Darwinian principles, as long as the three aforementioned
ingredients are present. When we look at culture, this seems indeed to be the case.
Apparently, Darwin’s formula reaches beyond the context of biology. Like biological
evolution, the evolution of culture seems to be governed by the algorithm of
variation, selection, and replication. Put differently, the evolution of ideas, concepts,
4 Sperber (1996), p. 100.
5 Dawkins (1986).
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technology, science, etc., is, just like biological evolution, the result of a cumulative
selection process in which the output of every selection cycle serves as input for the
next cycle, and so on. Thus given enough time and generations, cultural evolution too
can produce some truly awesome effects. In “Nature, Culture, and Co-evolution”, we
will have to ask ourselves how this extension of Darwinism to the realm of culture
should be understood. As pointed out earlier, some authors believe that culture is
directly linked to biological evolution, while others argue that culture evolves in its
own right, analogously to biological evolution. But before we delve into that matter,
we first have to look in more detail at some of the idiosyncrasies of human culture.
The Cultural Animal
It was Darwin who taught us that there is no sharp divide between man and the rest of
the animal kingdom. All creatures on our planet share a common ancestry, i.e., they
belong to the same natural system, a system that has gradually evolved and diversi-
fied for some 3.5 billion years, resulting in a staggering number of species, all
beautifully adapted to a particular environment and to the physical properties of our
planet. Yet in one way humans do differ dramatically from the rest of the animal
kingdom: man is a cultural animal, a species which not only accumulates genetic
information in successive generations but cultural information as well. Culture thus
involved a major transition in evolution: it changed the way in which information is
acquired, stored and transmitted to new generations.6 Hitherto the flow of information
was limited exclusively to the genetic level, a transmission channel which already
existed for 3.5 billion years. Culture opened up a new medium for evolution.
Information could now be passed on through language and imitation, resulting in
the rise of culture in all its different guises. Hence ‘culture’ can be defined as: all
information that is transmitted to next generations by non-genetic means, i.e., through
spoken or written language, teaching, or imitation.7
Obviously language plays a pivotal role in human evolution and may even be
considered a conditio sine qua non for the emergence of cumulative human culture.
Hence to do fully justice to the role of language probably would require an extensive
study in its own right.8 Here it may suffice to address two crucial aspects of the
human language system, i.e., its innateness and its adaptedness. Firstly, as Chomsky
(1972) pointed out, human language has a clear innate component. The infrastructure
of language is part of our biology, not in the sense that a particular language (say
English) is innate, because particular languages obviously are acquired through a
process of learning and education, but in the sense that humans have a general ability
to learn any natural language, especially when we are young. Chomsky believed that
all extant natural languages have deep structural similarities, a so-called ‘Universal
Grammar’ (UG) which is hard-wired into our brains. Loosely defined, UG means that
the human brain is primed to prefer some syntactic structures above others. Although
several aspects of UG are nowadays disputed by linguists, practically everybody still
6 See Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry (1995).
7 Similar definitions of ‘culture’ can be found in Richerson and Boyd (2005); Jablonka and Lamb (2005);
Plotkin (2010); Distin (2011), and Mesoudi (2011).
8 See Deacon (1997) for a comprehensive account of the origins of human language, and the co-evolution
of language and brain.
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agrees that the ability to acquire language is part of our biological make-up. Secondly,
so although Chomsky himself argued that some aspects of the human language
module are innate, he opposed the idea that the human language system is the result
of Darwinian cumulative evolution. In Chomsky’s view, language must rather be
understood as an accidental byproduct of the hominid’s increasing brain. This view
has met considerable critique. Chomsky’s idea is not very plausible because, as
Pinker (1994) has convincingly pointed out, the human language system clearly has
all the hallmarks of a complex adaptation, i.e., it consists of many independent
(anatomical, physiological, neurological) components that are all adjusted to each
other and to the system as a whole. Since complex adaptation can only be understood
as the result of cumulative Darwinian selection, it follows that our language system is
an adaptation that has evolved gradually and, in each step, must have conferred
greater advantage to our distant ancestors, particularly with regard to the transmission
of non-genetic, cultural information.
We humans are the first species with this special ability of cumulative social
transmission, allowing us to gather and transmit information on an unprecedented
scale. This particular ability gave us culture, science, technology and art, and thus
transformed the very core of what it is to be human. To be sure, some other animal
species can exchange non-genetic information as well, having forms of rudimentary
language and the ability to communicate and exchange information with each other.
For instance, think of the alarm calls of many species of animal, or the nut-cracking
and termite-fishing abilities of wild chimpanzees, or the ways in which some species
of songbirds learn their song.9 Yet, as Jablonka and Lamb (2005) point out, our social
transmission system differs from those in animals in that it is a symbolic communi-
cation system, and it is this particular quality of human thought and language that has
changed our world dramatically. Words can act as symbols because they are part of a
rule-governed system of signs, and the rules of language allow us to generate and
understand an infinite number of varied meaningful sentences. According to Jablonka
and Lamb, our symbolic system may have exactly the same basic neural under-
pinnings as information transmission in other animal species, but the nature of the
communication is completely different. Our symbolic thought and communication
system enabled the construction of a shared imagined reality: a world of culture,
symbols, and meaning. So although some animal species do have culture and even
cultural traditions like the presence of regional song dialects in songbirds, they
evidently lack cumulative culture, i.e., there is no gradual built-up of information
resulting in cultural artifacts or practices of increasing complexity.
According to Tomasello, human culture is unique in that the products of cultural
evolution far exceed anything that a single person could ever invent on his own in a
single lifetime. Tomasello et al. (1993) uses the metaphor of a ratchet and argues that
what distinguishes human culture from that of chimpanzees and other species is its
‘ratchet effect’. Cumulative cultural evolution not only requires creative invention but
also faithful social transmission that can work as a ratchet to prevent the newly
acquired information from slipping back. The ratchet thus preserves information, for
example a newly invented or improved artifact, from being lost, and it ensures that
modifications gradually accumulate over time. Animal culture does not accumulate in
9 See Whiten et al. (1999).
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this way, and rather surprisingly, it is probably not sheer creativity that is the obstacle
in animal cultural cumulative evolution, but the stabilizing ratchet effect. Many
primate species are capable of creative invention, but they lack the ability to faithfully
transmit such innovations to other individuals. Hence new information will get lost,
forcing individuals to start from scratch again and again.
So human culture differs dramatically from animal culture since only the former is
truly cumulative. Human beings are able to pool their cognitive resources in ways that
other animal species are not. According to Tomasello (2000), we probably owe this
fact to some properties of the human psyche. Human cultural learning and accumu-
lation are made possible by our ability to understand other individuals as beings like
ourselves with their own intentions and mental lives. This attribution of beliefs and
desires to other individuals, also known as ‘theory of mind’, is crucial in human
cultural learning because it enables humans not only to learn from the other, but also
through the other’s perspective.10 A theory of mind thus facilitates a process of
sociogenesis in which multiple individuals create something together that no indi-
vidual could have created on its own. Understanding others as intentional agents like
oneself creates a ratchet by faithfully preserving newly innovated strategies in the
social group until there is another innovation to replace them. But there is probably
more than one reason why human culture gradually builds up whereas animal culture
does not. I already mentioned our generative language as an effective means of
information transfer. Another, but related, aspect might be teaching. Human beings
possess a communication system that is modeled by natural selection to effectively
transmit information and knowledge between individuals, particularly between adults
and children. Human adults are predisposed to teach human children by adjusting
their speech and actions as to maximize the chance of learning, while human children
in turn are predisposed to take the adults’ speech and actions really seriously. The
predisposition thus manifests itself particularly in early stages of life where it
facilitates the acquisition of language and other skills that are difficult to learn at an
older age. The teaching system has therefore been appropriately dubbed ‘natural
pedagogy’.11 Mesoudi (2011) lists several other possible causes for the difference
between human culture and nonhuman culture, one of which is the apparent ‘sticky-
ness’ of the latter. Animals like chimpanzees do not possess the ability to easily
switch to a newly encountered, better way of doing something. Instead, they show an
inclination to stubbornly stick with their existing solution to a problem, however
inefficient or unpractical.
As Mesoudi points out, the distinction between cumulative en noncumulative
culture is extremely important, because only the former constitutes the gradual
evolutionary change that Darwin coined ‘descent with modification’. Put differently,
only cumulative culture evolves in a true Darwinian manner. As is the case in
biological evolution, in the domain of culture it is possible, at least in principle, to
identify different cultural lineages, like branches of a tree, in each of which small
modifications have been replicated and accumulated, resulting in cultural artifacts and
practices which display intricate design beyond a level that could be achieved by any
individual designer. Consider the level of technological wizardry we have achieved,
10 See also Tomasello (2006).
11 See Csibra and Gergely (2009); Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (2002).
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or the myriads of complex human cultural practices we encounter on our planet. It is
precisely this baffling level of complexity and design which suggests the need of a
Darwinian account. As Richerson and Boyd (2005) put it: ‘Even the greatest human
innovators are, in the great scheme of things, midgets standing on the shoulders of a
vast pyramid of other midgets.’12 The evolution of language, artifacts, and institu-
tions, Richerson & Boyd argue, can be divided up into small steps, and during each
step the modifications are relatively modest. For no single innovator contributes more
than a small portion of the total, just as any single gene contributes only marginally to
a complex organic adaptation. The history of technology shows that complex artifacts
like watches, cars and computers have not been created ex nihilo. They have been
built up gradually by the cumulative improvements of many innovators, each con-
tributing a small improvement to the present state. According to Richerson & Boyd,
this insight holds even for simple modern artifacts like forks, paper clips and zippers.
They too have evolved through the accumulation of many trials, some variants being
selectively retained, while others were discarded as inadequate. And what holds for
technological knowledge and material artifacts also holds for our languages, practi-
ces, and institutions. They too are far too complex for even the most gifted innovator
to create from scratch. Again, such intricate levels of complexity and design suggest
the necessity of a Darwinian explanation, or as Jablonka & Lamb put it: ‘What we are
interested in are complex cultural practices that did not emerge in one single step, but
are the result of cumulative historical processes. With such complex cultural practi-
ces, we can see no alternative to the assumption that the historical changes involved
some form of selective retention of cultural variants that allowed the elaboration of
the cultural practice.’13 In short, if we want to understand and explain the vast and
wonderful complexity of human cumulative culture, we seem to have little choice but
to invoke a Darwinian account.
Niche Construction and Human Cumulative Culture
Cumulative cultural evolution probably began with modern humans as they first
appeared in Eastern Africa some 200,000 years ago. Stringer (2011) argues that, at
first, humans probably lived in small populations of hunter-gatherers with little or no
contact with other such groups. Local inventions and accumulated knowledge thus
might have gone lost quite often. Only after bigger, stable populations emerged with
ample connections to others groups could information be preserved and faithfully be
transmitted to other individuals. According to Stringer, our ancestors probably
reached that crucial threshold some 50,000 years ago. Not surprisingly then, not long
after that threshold was reached a genuine ‘cultural big bang’ occurred, with the well-
known and beautiful examples of sophisticated Paleolithic cave art and stone-age
technology emerging in Europe.14 From then on culture accumulated bit-by-bit,
ultimately resulting in our current complex socio-cultural world which, next to the
physical and biological world, constitutes a new and self-created environment into
which all humans get immersed from birth. This phenomenon of organisms creating
12 Richerson and Boyd (2005), p. 50.
13 Jablonka and Lamb (2005), p. 228.
14 See Stringer (2011); Chauvet and Brunel Deschamps (2001).
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and changing their own environments, and thereby altering the sources of natural
selection and the direction of evolution, is called niche construction. According to
Laland et al. (2000) niche construction is a neglected process in the study of
evolution, particularly in the context of human evolution and the emergence of
cumulative culture.15 It is interesting and instructive to realize, for example, that
whereas our culture evolves very rapidly, our physical bodies have not noticeably
changed in the last 50,000 years or so. During this relatively long period there
probably has been no significant biological or genetic modification in humans
whatsoever. So everything we call culture and civilization we have built with the
same body and brain! A Cro-Magnon child born 50,000 years ago was anatomically
and neurologically identical to a child born today in New York, Lagos, or Beijing.
The big difference is that our cumulative culture has created a completely new
environment – a new niche – into which each new human child is born and to which
we all have to adapt. Compared to a Cro-Magnon child, a present-day infant might
well live on another planet! In effect, for an average human child to master the basic
facts of its culture and society it takes at least 10 to 15 years of intense education, and
even then it has barely scratched the surface. Incidentally, the fact that our world has
radically changed in the last 50,000 years, whereas our bodies and brains have not, is
the reason why evolutionary psychologists argue that we are still stuck with a ‘Stone
Age mind’. Because biological-genetic evolution is relatively slow, it could not keep
up with the pace of cultural evolution. Thus in our minds we are still Pleistocene
hunter-gatherers equipped with physiological propensities and mental modules adap-
ted to a life on the African savannah.16
But perhaps this idea is not entirely true, for it is evident that in some cases biological-
genetic evolution indeed did keep up with cultural evolution because some cultural
practices have changed our genetic makeup and hence our physiology. A classic
example is the case of adult lactose tolerance. The domestication of cattle and the
accompanying practice of dairying, probably first occurring some 10,000 years ago in
the Middle-East, did alter the selective environments for some human populations long
enough to select for genes that today confer greater adult lactose tolerance. Thus by
keeping cattle and using their products, humans have changed their niche in such ways
that it became advantageous for adult human beings to be able to digest milk. Niche
construction introduced novel selection pressures: by exploiting a new food resource,
like dairy products, a new digestive enzyme got selected.17
An earlier yet even more important example of the effects of human niche
construction is exemplified by the human brain. In the course of hominid evolution
the size of the brain has tripled from about 500 cm3 in Australopithecus, 750 cm3 in
H. habilis and 1000 cm3 in H. erectus, up to 1500 cm3 in modern H. sapiens. This
threefold increase of hominid brain size can perhaps only be made intelligible by
invoking the effects of niche construction. Aiello and Wheeler (1995) for instance
have suggested that our ancestors could afford a bigger and more ‘expensive’ brain
because they switched from being mostly vegetarian to eating meat. Since meat,
especially when it is cooked, is much easier to digest than vegetable food, it became
16 See Barkow et al. (1992); Mythen (1996).
17 See Durham (1991), chpt. 5.
15 See Odling-Smee et al. (2003).
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evolutionarily affordable to reduce the expensive tissue of the intestines in favor of
expensive brain tissue. The hypothesis is therefore appropriately called the ‘gut-brain
swap’. The rapid growth of the hominid brain, with all its accompanying consequences,
was made possible by the fact that early hominids changed their diets, switched to eating
meat, and began cooking their food. With the control of fire and the subsequent
invention of cooking, our ancestors changed their niche in such ways that they altered
the sources of natural selection, and ultimately, their path of evolution. Thus one of the
most sweeping events in hominid evolution, the remarkable growth of the human brain,
was initially triggered by a relatively modest change in cultural practice. Laland et al.
(2000) argue that this is an example of how a character – the human brain – evolved
despite fitness costs by paying for itself by its ‘inventive’ niche construction. Big brains
simply would not be adaptive without niche construction.
To be sure, niche construction is not confined to human beings alone. Many other
animal species are able to change their environments, thereby creating novel selection
pressures and altering the gene frequencies in their populations. But human beings are
somewhat special because, unlike most animal niche construction, much of human
niche construction is dominated by socially learned knowledge and cultural inherited
practices, thus creating a complex interaction between biological and cultural evolu-
tion. According to Laland et al. (2000), we can perhaps begin to understand this
complex process of co-evolution when we invoke the mechanism of niche construc-
tion. They write: ‘[N]iche construction modifies one or more sources of natural
selection in a population’s environment and, in doing so, generates a form of
feedback in evolution that is not yet fully appreciated.’18 If the cultural inheritance
of a niche-altering human activity persists for enough generations to generate a stable
selection pressure, it will be able to influence and direct human biological-genetic
evolution. The cultural practice of prehistoric dairy farming, we have seen, provides a
case in point. Note incidentally that the phenomenon of niche construction is to some
extent reminiscent of Dawkins’ notion of the extended phenotype.19 Dawkins argued
that genes can express themselves outside the individual organisms (phenotypes) that
carry them, for instance by generating certain behavior like nest- or burrow-building.
Thus a bird’s nest and a beaver’s dam are examples of extended phenotypes which
increase the chance that the genes responsible for the extended phenotype will be
passed on. Like in the case of niche construction, the altered environment influences
and modifies the sources of natural selection, thereby changing the path of evolution.
In any case, it is important to realize that niche construction can generate an unusual
evolutionary dynamics. In fact Laland et al. believe that niche construction may be of
greater evolutionary importance than generally conceived. To their mind, a description
of evolutionary change relative only to independent environments is too restrictive: ‘In
the presence of niche construction, adaptation ceases to be a one-way process, exclu-
sively a response to environmentally imposed problems; it becomes instead a two-way
process, with populations of organisms setting as well as solving problems.’20
Especially in the case of human evolution, niche construction has important implications
for the relationship between biological evolution and cultural change. In human
18 Laland et al. (2000), p. 133.
19 See Dawkins (1982).
20 Laland et al. (2000), p. 135.
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(pre)history our culture has continuously modified natural selection pressures in human
environments.
What is also important to realize is that culture has brought about its own
transmission channel through which information gets passed on to next generations.
As we have seen in “Darwin’s Formula”, Darwin’s formula of variation, selection,
and replication is substrate-neutral which means that in principle any dynamic system
could evolve according to Darwinian principles. Human culture is such a dynamic
system. The third element of the formula – replication – is realized not by (a)sexual
reproduction, i.e., the copying of genes, but by language and imitation, allowing
information to accumulate and culture to evolve. So in the case of culture we are
dealing with socially learned information and cultural transmission. I will say some-
thing about social learning shortly, first I address the complex phenomenon of
cultural transmission. As Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) already pointed out in
their seminal work, the transmission of information can depend on several modes of
cultural inheritance, including so-called ‘vertical’ transmission (from parent-to-
offspring), ‘horizontal’ transmission (among peers from the same generation), and
‘oblique’ transmission (from members of one generation to members of a later
generation, as in the case of formal teaching). Note the obvious difference between
biological-genetic inheritance and cultural inheritance. Whereas biological-genetic
inheritance almost exclusively relies on vertical (parent-to-offspring) inheritance, in
cultural inheritance the transmission of information has many different guises be-
cause cultural information can be transmitted in lots of different ways. In the realm of
human culture vertical transmission can even be reversed as when parents, or even
grandparents, can learn things from their (grand)children. But horizontal transmission
might be equally important. In fact, if vertical, downward transmission would be the
only direction in which cultural information would flow, cultures would probably be
very static. For a culture to be innovative, horizontal transmission is needed, i.e., a
novel idea should not only spread from parents to offspring but to contemporaries as
well. Apart from the different paths, there also are notable differences in speed by
which cultural information is transmitted. In small prehistoric groups of hunter-
gatherers the mode of transmission was probably often vertical and one-to-few or
even one-to-one, resulting in a relative slow stream of information, whereas nowa-
days with the ever growing influence of the internet and social media, the mode has
changed to horizontal and one-to-many, resulting in information racing continuously
around the globe with lightning speed. In short, the pioneering work of Cavalli-Sforza
& Feldman made it possible to model all these different modes and channels of
transmission and to assess the consequences with regard to their respective speeds
and directions.21
In fact, it is worth mentioning here that the mathematical models and techniques
used by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) amongst
others to study cultural evolution were inspired by the Modern Synthesis in biology
and the models and techniques employed in the 1920s by scientists like R.A. Fisher,
J.B.S. Haldane and Sewall Wright to study biological-genetic evolution. The under-
lying assumption, of course, is that both biological and cultural evolution are at
bottom Darwinian processes. Hence the mathematical tools used to understand,
21 See also Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (2002).
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explain and predict the effects of micro-evolutionary processes in biological evolu-
tion, like natural selection and genetic drift, can be used to study cultural evolution as
well. As Mesoudi (2011) explains, in a typical cultural evolution model, a population
is assumed to be composed of a set of individuals, each of whom possesses a
particular set of cultural traits. Next a set of micro-evolutionary processes is specified
that alters the variation in those traits over time. These processes concern the sources
of cultural variation, the forms of cultural selection, and the different modes of
cultural transmission. Finally variation is transmitted to the next generation, simulat-
ing the process of cultural inheritance. The mathematical models and techniques can
then be used to understand and predict the long-term (i.e., macro-evolutionary)
consequences in cultural variation over time. Employed in a computer simulation,
the models for instance could indicate whether some variants might increase in the
population or instead go extinct, or whether two or more variants perhaps can coexist
indefinitely, etc. Not surprisingly, each of these processes have different macro-
evolutionary consequences for how a particular culture as a whole changes over
time. In the end the initial make-up of a population might well be totally transformed,
having changed a culture into something completely new and different.
As pointed out above, another important feature of cumulative cultural evolution is
social learning. Laland et al. (2000) define social learning as: ‘A general capacity to
acquire information from others, regardless of the nature of the information, its
function, or the sensory modality involved.’22 Again, they argue that the increasing
reliance of our early ancestors on social learning only becomes intelligible in the light
of niche construction. Our ancestors constructed niches in which it ‘paid’ them to
transmit more information to their offspring and to other members of their group.
After all, vital accumulated knowledge about the environment, prey animals, hunting
techniques, edible and medicinal plants, seasonal changes, etc., surely would be
worth sharing with tribe members. Thus with the advent of human niche construction,
it became more and more advantageous to transmit cultural information via a process
of social learning. It might even have triggered an autocatalytic process in which
niche construction led to more social learning, while social learning in turn led to
more niche construction, and so on. With such a self-enforcing feedback process,
culture could easily accumulate and bootstrap itself to higher and more complex
levels, and possibly even result in some kind of runaway evolution.23
So what should become clear is that niche construction, culture, and the human
mind are inextricably tied together in a firm triadic relationship. The modern human
mind probably evolved from the more primitive primate mind through a series of
major transitions, each of which led to the emergence of a new representational
system and corresponding new levels of culture. So our ancestors did not simply
evolve bigger brains or an extended memory. First and foremost they evolved new
systems for representing reality, i.e., the hominid mind finally managed to grasp the
use of symbols. Donald (1991) has distinguished three fundamental stages in the
origins of culture and the evolution of the modern human mind. The first stage is the
advent of what he calls ‘mimetic culture’ (not to be confused with Dawkins’ memetic
culture, see “Nature, Culture, and Co-evolution” below). Mimetic culture was an
22 Laland et al. (2000), p. 141.
23 See Laland (2008).
Philosophia (2013) 41:661–691 673
important threshold in hominid evolution because it gave our Stone Age ancestors the
ability to represent knowledge through manual or facial gestures, mime, and other
voluntary motor acts.24 This communication system enabled them to share knowl-
edge with group members, with learning taking the form of direct instruction,
imitation, and meaningful group rituals. Mimetic culture eventually resulted in
sophisticated tool-making, fire use, coordinated seasonal hunting, rapid adaptation
to different climates, intricate social structure, burials, and other symbolic rituals.
Donald argues that mimetic culture did not require the use of spoken language. High-
speed vocal language is probably a relatively recent invention, unique to H. sapi-
ens.25 Mimetic culture, by contrast, is much older and was probably already mastered
by H. erectus, some two million years ago. This successful Paleolithic hominid
cooperated in seasonal hunting, migrated over long distances (i.e., from Africa to
the Middle-East, Europe and Asia), used fire, cooked food, and evolved a brain that
eventually reached 80 % of the volume of the modern human brain.
A second major step was the evolutionary transition from mimetic culture to what
Donald calls ‘mythic culture’. Mimetic skills could only take hominid culture so far,
hence language emerged to allow for more precise and extended communication
between individuals. Donald calls this culture ‘mythic’ because he believes that myth
was the primary function of this ancient, prehistoric language. Mythic culture enabled
our ancestors to pass on collective accumulated knowledge much more efficient to
other members of the group and to members of the next generation. The ability to
convey knowledge through oral tradition and mythic narrative is probably between
100,000 and 200,000 years old, coinciding with the appearance of H. sapiens in
Africa. In addition to the earlier mimetic era, mythical culture gave our ancestors a
new, collective system for understanding and representing the word around them. The
full potential of mythic culture revealed itself when H. sapiens arrived in Europe,
somewhere between 50,000 and 40,000 years ago. Here mythic culture famously
gave rise to symbolic art in the form of artistic cave paintings, human and animal
figurines, and other delicate artifacts.
The third and, for the moment, latest stage in the evolution of the hominid mind
and hominid culture is characterized by the fact that, henceforth, collective accumu-
lated knowledge was no longer restricted to the bounds of the human brain and body,
but could now be gathered in ‘external storage systems’. That is, knowledge could
now be written down in the form of cuneiforms, hieroglyphs, and other symbolic sign
systems. Donald calls this stage ‘theoretic culture’ because for the first time accu-
mulated knowledge, now durably recorded in external media, enabled humans to
reflect on their collective wisdom. Theoretic culture probably originated some
10,000 years ago in the Middle-East, and eventually gave our Neolithic ancestors
not only the opportunity to reflect upon but also to critically examine their culture,
thus establishing the first rudimentary forms of religion, philosophy, and science.
Donald argues that this third transition has led to one of the greatest reconfigurations
24 Apes, monkeys and other primates possess what Donald calls ‘episodic culture’, i.e., they live their lives
entirely in the present and are always bound to the concrete situation or episode. The social behavior of
non-human primates reflects this situational limitation. Mimetic culture, in contrast, allows the use of
abstract symbolic representations and the sharing and accumulation of knowledge.
25 The hypothesis that communication through manual and facial gestures may have preceded vocal
language can also be found in Corballis (2002). See also Deacon (1997).
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of cognitive structure in primate history, and again, without much genetic change.
While our genome may be 98 or 99 % identical to that of chimpanzees, and even
100 % identical to that of Cro-Magnons, our minds and our cognitive structure clearly
are not. Obviously genes do not make the difference, accumulated culture does. In
fact, we humans may now have reached a critical point in our cultural and cognitive
evolution because we are perhaps on the brink of another major transition in human
evolution. More than ever in our hominid past we presently are symbol-using, net-
worked, social creatures, engaged in a seemingly ongoing technological and digital
revolution, exemplified par excellence by the emergence of populous social media and
the ever expanding world wide web. The construction of this new, virtual niche might
have a profound and irreversible influence on the future course of human evolution.26
Nature, Culture, and Co-evolution
Now even if we are willing to accept the idea that human culture evolves and
accumulates according to Darwinian principles, we still have to explicate in what
manner cultural evolution is tied to biological evolution. In principle we can choose
between two different and rivaling models. The first model, represented by human
sociobiology and kindred research programs like evolutionary psychology, states that
human culture is directly linked to biological evolution because what counts in the
end is the genetic fitness of the creatures that possess culture, i.e., us. The emergence
of culture was rewarded by natural selection because culture must have been advan-
tageous to our ancestors, otherwise culture simply would not exist. Thus ultimately
culture must be viewed as a biological phenomenon, a complex biological adaptation
that allows human beings to cope with the most diverse environments. The second,
rivaling model, represented by memetics, states that human culture is no longer (or at
least not always) directly linked to biological evolution. Culture may have had its
roots in biological evolution, but at some point in history culture took up a life of its
own. That is, like biological evolution, culture evolves in itself because it too contains
the three ingredients of Darwin’s formula: variation, selection, and replication. After
all, what holds for genes might also hold for ideas, or ‘memes’ as Dawkins (1976) has
coined the units of cultural evolution. However, despite the fact that both research
programs have offered several interesting insights, I also think that both programs are
seriously flawed, either because they underestimate the influence of culture, as in the
case of human sociobiology, or because they push analogies too far, as in the case of
memetics. Let us start with sociobiology. When Wilson (1975) first introduced
sociobiology, critics were enraged over the fact that human beings, with all their
cultural splendor, were treated as just another animal, apparently completely deter-
mined by the instructions of their genes. Clearly, Wilsons seminal ideas did not fall on
fertile ground, partly because at that time – the 1970s – many people believed that
human behavior was determined by culture rather than nature. Let us call that idea the
Culture-First approach. Adherents of the Culture-First approach depicted Wilson as a
blunt reductionist and genetic determinist. Yet both charges were ill-founded because
Wilson was neither. As we shall see, although he argues that human nature generally
26 See Schaller et al. (2010).
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has the upper hand over culture, Wilson does not deny that culture in turn can change
human nature.
Human sociobiologists argue that cultural evolution is a part of and therefore
subordinate to biological evolution because all social behavior, including behavior
associated with culture, has a biological basis. So inevitably culture will be con-
strained in accordance with its effects on the human gene pool, or as Wilson
(in)famously put it: ‘Genes hold culture on a leash’.27 Culture has a certain freedom
and latitude to develop in all kinds of directions, but if a culture turns itself against
human nature, for example by promoting collective suicide or childlessness, it will
either be pulled back by the leash and obey the imperatives of human nature, or go
extinct. So the margins in which a culture can wander and flourish are determined and
limited by the survival of our genes. Hence our biology puts constraints on the ways
culture can evolve. In a similar vein, evolutionary psychologists claim that human
psychological traits like perception, cognition, language, memory, emotions, etc., are
evolved adaptations modeled by natural selection. These and other human character-
istics allowed our ancestors to cope with life on the African savannah, an environ-
ment where by far the longest part of hominid evolution took place. Recall the
evolutionary psychologists’ notion of the Stone Age mind (“Niche Construction
and Human Cumulative Culture”). Because biological evolution allegedly could not
keep up with the pace of cultural evolution, we are still stuck with a mind equipped
for Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. So sociobiology and evolutionary psychology share
the belief that human beings – including their minds, behavior and culture – are
foremost biological creatures. We are molded by nature rather than culture, which
also means that psychology should become a branch of biology. As the evolutionary
psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (1992) put it: ‘Human minds, human behavior,
human artifacts, and human culture are all biological phenomena—aspects of the
phenotypes of humans and their relationships with one another.’28 Also notice again
the resemblance with Dawkins’ notion of the extended phenotype. Like a bird’s nest
or a beaver’s dam, human culture could be viewed as a biological characteristic which
extends far beyond the individual human phenotype.
In short, human sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists both try to under-
stand the human mind and human social behavior, including the behavior that
resulted in the origin and evolution of culture, in terms of our biology. Nature
overrules culture because, ultimately, culture is a far-extended expression of certain
human genes. Let us call this idea the Nature-First approach. The Nature-First
approach involves the systematic study of the biological basis of the human mind
and human social behavior, and it proclaims that human culture is embedded within
the wider and much older framework of human nature. Our evolved psychological
dispositions, mental modules, and innate learning capacities, or ‘epigenetic rules’ as
Wilson calls them, bias and thus constrain the ways in which culture can evolve.29 To
be sure the Nature-First approach has a certain appeal because nobody would deny
that human beings indeed are biological creatures without whom cumulative culture
would never have emerged. Nor should anybody deny that an understanding of the
27 Wilson (1978), p. 167.
28 Tooby and Cosmides (1992), pp. 20–21. See also Laland and Brown (2002).
29 Lumsden and Wilson (1981), p. 370.
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basic biological constraints on human behavior is simply indispensible for the study
of culture. The problem lies somewhere else.
The main flaw of the Nature-First approach is that it neglects the influence of
culture and the ways in which cultural evolution can feedback onto biological-genetic
evolution. In “The Cultural Animal” we have already encountered several examples
of such feedback processes, like the case of lactose tolerance and the case of the
expanding hominid brain. Both cases are examples of cultural evolution feeding back
on biological evolution, thereby changing our genetic blueprint and physiology. The
cultural practice of dairy farming altered the human digestive system, and the cultural
practice of cooking and eating meat triggered the spectacular growth of the hominid
brain. So because culture can change certain selection pressures and hence the path of
biological evolution, the Nature-First approach had to be adjusted. Lumsden and
Wilson (1981) already rectified this omission by postulating a model of gene-culture
co-evolution in which genes and culture are intimately connected. So instead of
nature ruling over culture, the two forces are now involved in an intensive and
graceful pas de deux. Genes (indirectly) influence culture through the working of
epigenetic rules, but culture influences epigenetic rules – and therefore genes – as
well. Different cultural practices (e.g., dairy farming or cooking food) can lead to
shifts in the sorts of epigenetic rules that are useful, and consequently to changes in
which genes are passed on.
Next a further major improvement was made by Boyd and Richerson (1985) when
they introduced their model of ‘dual inheritance’, i.e., the idea that culture not only
feedbacks on our genes, but that culture has its own inheritance system as well. We
already encountered this idea in “The Cultural Animal”. Dual inheritance means that
there are two ways in which information can be transmitted to the next generation.
The first way is genetic transmission through the replication of DNA, the second way
is non-genetic, cultural transmission through imitation or spoken and written word. In
both inheritance systems we see Darwin’s formula of variation, selection, and repli-
cation at work, which means that some variants (whether genetic or cultural) are
selectively retained, resulting in a gradual accumulation of information. Recall that
Darwin’s formula is substrate neutral: in principle any ‘dynamic system’ could evolve
provided that the three necessary elements are present. Culture, Boyd & Richerson
argue, is such a dynamic system. So compared to the model of co-evolution, the dual
inheritance model is even more complex because there now are two closely interact-
ing levels at which cumulative selection and thus Darwinian evolution takes place.
Richerson and Boyd (2005) argue that the human cultural system arose as an
adaptation because it allowed humans to swiftly adapt to lots of different and
changing environments, much more swiftly than is possible by genes alone. Or as
they put it: ‘Culture would never have evolved unless it could do things that genes
can’t.’30 Laland et al. (2000) have employed mathematical models to examine this
claim. These models confirm that culture and social learning are indeed advantageous
when environments change too rapidly for the genetic system to keep track of the
novel conditions. The genetic system would only be able to cope when environments
change very slowly and information updating would not be needed frequently.
Reversely, when environments change too quickly, or when sudden environmental
30 Richerson and Boyd (2005), p. 7.
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shifts occur, social learning and vertical (from parents to offspring) transmission
would be error prone. In such extreme cases horizontally (within-generation) trans-
mitted information should be favored. So according to Laland et al., cumulative
culture and social learning are advantageous only when ‘changes are not so fast that
parents and offspring experience different environments, but not so slow that appro-
priate genetically transmitted information could evolve instead.’31 Paleoclimatic and
geological data seem to confirm that Pleistocene hominids had to cope with such
‘intermediate’ environmental changes.
In any case, social learning by acquiring information from others seems to bring
lots of benefits. Amongst others, it allows human beings to swiftly adapt to a wide
range of different environments but, as Richerson & Boyd explain, ‘it also opens a
portal into people’s brains through which maladaptive ideas can enter – ideas whose
content makes them more likely to spread, but do not increase the genetic fitness of
their bearers.’32 So culture (i.e., social learning) solves the problem of living nearly
anywhere in the world, but at a price. That price is that we play host to many ‘selfish’
cultural variants like urban legends, chain letters, viral videos, earworms (i.e., a piece
of music that keeps going round and round in one’s head), spam, cults, tweets, hypes,
and so on. Apparently culture has a certain autonomy – it may sometimes break loose
from the leash – because the interests of genes and culture do not always coincide.
Culture may even go against the biological imperatives of survival and reproduction,
for instance when people consume too much high-calorie food, smoke cigarettes,
practice celibacy, or get involved in contagious suicide, etc. Such behavior is surely
maladaptive from the genes’ eye point of view, so why does it persist? In order to
unlock this riddle we have to ask ourselves the ultimate Darwinian question: Who
benefits? In the aforementioned cases it clearly are not the genes that profit but certain
ideas or habits which reappear again and again because they ‘infect’ people’s minds
and thus keep showing up in successive generations. Cultural variants like chain
letters and urban legends are selfish because they do not benefit the people who copy
them – they benefit their own propagation.
Genes, Memes, and Flawed Analogies
The idea that human cumulative culture is a process with its own evolutionary
dynamics, and that cultural variants often act as to maximize their own fitness instead
of that of their bearers, brings us to memetics, the study of memes. The idea of
memetics was first introduced by Dawkins (1976). His definition of a meme is: ‘A
unit of cultural inheritance, hypothesized as analogous to the particulate gene, and as
naturally selected by virtue of its ‘phenotypic’ consequences on its own survival and
replication in the cultural environment.’33 Memes (an abbreviation of the Greek word
for imitation: mimeme) are the cultural analogues of genes. As in the case of genes we
can make a distinction between a meme’s ‘genotype’, i.e., its underlying mental
(neural) representation in the brain, and the meme’s ‘phenotype’, i.e., its visible (or
audible, etc.) expression in the outside world. The phenotypic effects of a meme can
31 Laland et al. (2000), p. 141.
32 Richerson and Boyd (2005), p. 150.
33 Dawkins (1982), p. 290.
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manifest themselves in words, music, art, skills, science, etc. These manifestations
may then be perceived by other individuals and imprint themselves on their brains, in
which case the meme has replicated itself. A meme, in short, is a unit of cultural
information which survives and reproduces by leaping from brain to brain. Like
genes, memes are involved in a constant and fierce struggle for survival. After all, not
every idea that pops up will survive. On the contrary, it is more likely that most ideas
are quickly forgotten, but now and again a meme might be selectively retained and
then be transmitted to a next generation. And again, because the Darwinian selection
process is cumulative in character, information will gradually build up and thus create
a huge reservoir of ‘memetic’ information. That immense and ever-changing reser-
voir of ideas, concepts, fashions and gadgets is our culture.
As we have seen, memes may not always be beneficial to their ‘hosts’, i.e., the
individuals in which they reside. Like genes, memes are essentially ‘selfish’: all that
counts is that they get transmitted, unaltered, to the next generation. So the survival
conditions for memes are essentially the same as for genes, namely: longevity,
fecundity, and copying-fidelity.34 For a meme to be successful and to become part
of an established culture it must be long-lasting, capable of making good copies of
itself, and get in as many brains as possible. But there are several other interesting
parallels between genes and memes, for instance they both are carriers of information.
Genes carry information, or instructions, for building proteins and bits of organisms.
Memes carry information, or instructions, for building bits of culture. A meme is a
piece of symbolic information which resides in a particular neural pattern in our brain
and which can be translated into many different mediums. A piece of music, for
example, can be performed in a live concert, or just resound in one’s head, but it may
also be recorded on hard disc, magnetic tape or vinyl, or written down in sheet music,
etc. Notice also that both genes and memes can carry and transmit latent information.
Like genes, memes do not necessarily have to be expressed or acted upon in order for
them to be transmitted. A recessive gene may lie dormant for many generations
before it expresses itself again. Likewise, a piece of music can be transmitted through
the ages without actually being performed. Or to use a more homely example:
granny’s cake recipe may be passed down through the family for several generations
without someone actually baking the cake. Again there is a parallel with genes.
According to Dawkins, only a change in the recipe (the encoded information or
genotype) is heritable, and can therefore be transmitted, a change in the cake (the
phenotype) is not. The same principle holds for genes: only genetic information is
heritable and transmittable, acquired phenotypic characters are not. Another, but more
controversial, parallel between genes and memes is Dawkins’ replicator-vehicle
distinction. According to Dawkins a meme, like a gene, is a ‘replicator’, i.e., an
entity that is capable of making copies of itself and, by doing so, preserving the
information which it contains through successive generations. For three billion years,
genes were the only replicators on our planet, but once creatures with language and
minds emerged, a new kind of replicator – the meme – took its chance and created a
whole new space of possibilities. Human brains (or human beings in general) thus are
the hosts or ‘vehicles’ of replicating memes. Memes use us (and our brains) as a
34 Dawkins (1976), p. 194.
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convenient means of transport for their long journey through the generations.35
However Hull (1988, 1989) has rightly argued that the term ‘vehicle’ has several
undesirable connotations, since vehicles are commonly associated with the sorts of
things agents ride around in, and what is more, the agents are in control: they steer
and the vehicles simply follow. But that is not a realistic picture because the entities in
which genes and memes reside (i.e., living beings) are much more than passive
vehicles. Hull therefore suggested the term ‘interactor’ which bypasses the negative
connotations of Dawkins’ terminology. According to Hull an interactor is: ‘An entity
that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this
interaction causes replication to be differential.’36 Put differently, because replicators
are not directly visible to selection (i.e., they cannot interact directly with their
environments), they need interactors that can. The ways in which these interactors
cope with their environments then will determine the fate of the replicators involved.
We have seen that cumulative cultural evolution has its own inheritance system, a
transmission channel that accumulates information which could never have been
gathered by any single individual. But such a broadband transmission system also
opens a hatch through which maladaptive cultural variants can enter, i.e., memes that
do not increase, and even may go against, the genetic fitness of their bearer. But of
course the vast majority of memes is beneficial, they make up our accumulated
culture which determines who we are, what we think, and how we behave. It is
cumulative culture, and not our genes, that sets us apart from our closest primate
relatives. Cumulative cultural evolution gave us language, art, technology, political
systems, law and civilization. Without the ability to transmit and accumulate cultural
information we would still be living in caves. In sum, many cultural phenomena are
unexplainable by appealing to genes alone, especially those aspects that are not
directly linked to one’s genetic fitness. For those cases we have to invoke a model
of dual inheritance and co-evolution in which genes and memes each play their
respective roles, and in which culture may also evolve for its own sake, without
any benefit for the meme’s host. In contrast with the earlier Culture-First and Nature-
First approaches, we might call this view the Evolution-First approach because it
emphasizes the fact that both our nature and our culture are governed by Darwin’s
formula of variation, selection, and replication. Recall that wherever you find these
three ingredients, you will find Darwinian, cumulative evolution. So my analysis
does not strictly focus on any particular medium of evolution but rather on the
process itself.
Before we take a more critical look at the idea of memes in a moment, a brief aside
might be instructive because the idea that culture evolves is not confined to memetics
alone. In the past authors like Toulmin, Popper and Hull amongst others already have
proposed similar ideas, albeit that they focused on one special aspect of our culture:
natural science. In talking about the development of science as ‘evolutionary’ these
philosophers were not employing a mere façon de parler or metaphor, but took the
claim quite seriously. Toulmin (1967, 1972) evolutionary approach was meant as a
35 According to Dennett (1995, 2002) and Blackmore (1999, 2000) memes are viruses of the mind: they
spread by infecting us and turning us into their ‘meme machines’. When memes have entered our brains,
they act as body snatchers by controlling our behavior in such ways as to produce even more memes.
36 Hull (1988), pp. 408. Italics in original.
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reply to Kuhn’s (1962) controversial claim that the history of science is punctuated by
conceptual revolutions which cause science to break up into incommensurable
paradigms. In contrast Toulmin emphasized the rational coherence and apparent
continuity that underlie these changes: the development of science is evolutionary
rather than revolutionary.37 In a similar vein Popper (1972) has stressed that the
growth of scientific knowledge is a rational and progressive process governed by
Darwinian selection mechanisms. Here is a well-known quote from Popper:
[T]he growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling
what Darwin called ‘natural selection’; that is, the natural selection of hypoth-
eses: our knowledge consists, at every moment, of those hypotheses which have
shown their (comparative) fitness by surviving so far in their struggle for
existence; a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which
are unfit.38
Popper argued that absolute truth is not be attainable for us, fallible creatures, but
we may nevertheless improve our knowledge by a process of trial and error in which
theories that stand the test of falsification are selectively retained. Finally Hull (1988,
2001) showed that natural science is propelled by a process of cumulative selection,
and that scientific evolution results in conceptual lineages which can be traced back
through time. Hull’s analysis is mainly genealogical in character. Like Toulmin he
shows how dynamic systems (e.g., natural science) may evolve into something
radically new and different while at the same time retaining their rational coherence
and identity. Like biological species, scientific disciplines and research programs are
historical, evolving entities which do not necessarily retain a distinctive and everlast-
ing core or essence.
Now returning to our discussion of memetics, we have to wind up this section by
addressing the critique that the meme idea has provoked.39 I believe that memetics
certainly has merits, but I also think that the analogy is frequently being stretched too
far because in some aspects memes seem to be very different from genes. In fact the
main and most common objection against memetics is that it is not at all clear what
memes really are. Supposedly they are mental representations in the mind or neural
patterns in the brain, but unfortunately up to now nobody has been able to back up
such claims. So we do know what genes are (a functional and hereditary bit of DNA),
but we have no clue what memes are. On the other hand, perhaps future science may
unravel this issue, thus making it an empirical question whether memes have a
physical basis in the brain or not. And we should not forget that in the nineteenth
century Gregor Mendel postulated the existence of genes and inferred the laws of
genetics from his experiments with pea plants, although at that time nobody knew
whether genes existed, let alone how they are physically realized. Perhaps we are now
at a similar juncture with regard to memes. Another objection against memetics is that
the analogy between genes and memes falls short because genes are discrete, particle-
37 Surprisingly, in an attempt to rebut the charge that he was a relativist, in 1970 Kuhn added a postscript to
his book, arguing that there are indeed certain remarkable parallels between biological evolution and the
development of natural science. In the postscript Kuhn seems to admit that there is more continuity and
progress in science then he previously suggested.
38 Popper (1972), p. 261. Italics in original. See also Munz (1993).
39 See Aunger (2000) (Ed.) for a critical appraisal of memetics.
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like entities whereas memes apparently are not. After all, memes seem to come in all
sorts of kinds, shapes and sizes. Memes can be small, discrete cultural units like the
song ‘Happy Birthday’ or Pythagoras’ theorem, but they also can be quite complex
and diffuse like the Italian cuisine or Christianity. For this reason Richerson and Boyd
(2005) say that they prefer the term ‘cultural variant’ instead of ‘meme’.40 The point
is that memes might not have to be discrete, genelike particles in order for Darwinian
cultural evolution to occur. Ardent adherents of memetics like Blackmore (1999,
2000) and Dennett (1995, 2002) seem to think that genelike replicators are necessary
for cultural evolution, but that might not be the case. Memes, whatever they are and
however they are realized, only have to compete and be replicated in order for
differential selection – and hence Darwinian evolution – to take place.
Related to the previous issue is the objection that whereas genes are truly repli-
cated, memes are not. Surely memes are being transmitted or imitated somehow, but
this process is very different, in execution and in accuracy, from the way in which
genetic information is replicated. Memes are ‘replicated’ or ‘copied’ only in a very
loose and broad sense. In fact, high-fidelity replication of memes might well be
disadvantageous, particularly in fast-changing societies, for as Jablonka and Lamb
(2005) point out: ‘It is not a good idea to stick faithfully to your parent’s style of
dress, way of speaking, and type of automobile.’41 The critique that, unlike genes,
memes are not truly replicated is mainly due to Sperber (2000). Sperber admits that
cultural items are ‘re-produced’ in the sense that they are produced again and
again, with a causal link between all these productions, but they are not
reproduced in the sense of being copied from one another. After all, cultural
information might easily blend or be changed by the people who receive the
information and then pass it on. So, according to Sperber, in cultural transmis-
sion no true replication or strong inheritance occurs. However against Sperber
one might argue that, like the supposed particle-like character of memes, high-
fidelity replication might not be a necessary requirement for Darwinian cultural
evolution. Of course, nobody denies that the transmission of cultural information
differs from the transmission of genetic information, if only because the former
process generally does not involve sex. But apart from such obvious differences,
what counts is that information – in either realm – is being transmitted in such
ways that information, whether genetic or cultural, can selectively be retained and
then accumulate. As I have argued earlier, the key feature of Darwinian evolution
is that it is powered by a cumulative selection process. In the realm of culture
the accumulation of information is obvious. In fact, if cultural transmission would
involve the constant blending of information, there would not be any cultural
continuity, traditions or folklore at all. Recall Tomasello’s ratchet effect (“The
Cultural Animal”). What prevents accumulated or newly acquired information
from being lost is faithful social transmission. Faithful transmission preserves
information and it ensures that slight modifications and improvements gradually
accumulate over time. So high-fidelity replication is perhaps not necessary for
cultural evolution to be Darwinian. Or as Jablonka & Lamb put it: ‘What matters
is not the fidelity of transmission, but the functional adequacy of any change in
40 Richerson and Boyd (2005), p. 63.
41 Jablonka and Lamb (2005), p. 221.
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a cultural element.’42 In sum, there might be no strong analogy between genes
and memes, but nevertheless the same Darwinian logic applies: we try to figure
out what processes cause some cultural variants to survive and flourish and
others to go extinct.
Culture’s Blind Edge and Lamarckian Flavors
Over the years critics have raised many objections against the idea that culture (and
science) genuinely evolve.43 In this final section I want to concentrate on two general
objections which usually figure at the top of many a critics’ list, i.e., the apparent
directedness of cultural evolution, and its alleged Lamarckian character. Although
these two issues are closely related, it might nevertheless be helpful if we treat them
separately. So let us start with the first objection. Several authors have argued that
cultural evolution simply cannot be Darwinian because biological evolution involves
‘blind’ variation while cultural evolutions seems to involve ‘guided’ variation.
Biological variation is blind or ‘random’ because there is no foresight or purpose
involved. Biological variation (mutation and recombination) cannot anticipate any
existing selection pressures in a population because it does not come according to
need. By contrast, cultural variation is guided or ‘nonrandom’ because new variants
are usually generated consciously and purposively by human beings. Apparently we
can actively seek out the variations and inventions that are needed. Thus at its heart
cultural evolutions seems to differ from biological evolution: cultural variation is
directed whereas genetic variation is not. And what is more, since cultural variation
seems to be guided, we have to ask ourselves whether such a process still counts as
being genuinely Darwinian.44
Apparently this line of critique assumes that blind variation is the essence of
Darwinian evolution. But is that really true? Would Darwin’s formula not work if
the variation were not genuinely random but instead directed or guided somehow? Of
course it would. Let me explain. Earlier I have argued that the key feature of
Darwinian evolution is cumulative selection. The presence of a cumulative sieving
or winnowing mechanism is what distinguishes Darwinian evolution from other
kinds of dynamic processes (see “Darwin’s Formula”). Only cumulative selection is
capable of producing complex designs and adaptations, and such a mechanism would
still be operable even if the variation were not truly random but instead guided
somehow. In fact, guided variation would only increase the efficiency of such a
process. The phenomenon of artificial selection is a case in point. Darwin discovered
the principle of natural selection by reasoning analogically from the way in which
farmers and fanciers have improved their stock and crops by constantly selecting the
42 Jablonka and Lamb (2005), p. 221. Italics in original. See also Richerson and Boyd (2005, p. 60). They
write: ‘A Darwinian account of culture does not imply that culture must be divisible into tiny, independent
genelike bits that are faithfully replicated. Rather, the best evidence suggests that cultural variants are only
loosely analogous to genes. Cultural transmission often does not involve high-fidelity replication; nor are
cultural variants always tiny snippets of information. Nonetheless, cultural evolution is fundamentally
Darwinian in its basic structure.’
43 For a comprehensive survey of the (dis)analogies between biological evolution and cultural (scientific)
evolution, see Buskes (1998). See also Nelson (2007).
44 This line of critique can be found in Elster (1979); Ruse (1986) and Thagard (1988).
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best individuals, to the way in which nature has improved the design of organisms by
constantly selecting the individuals that are best adapted to their environment. In
other words, in the process of improving cattle or crops both variation and selection
are deliberately and consciously guided by human beings. The variation is guided
because only a small sample of variants gets selected for further propagation, namely
those that are biased towards human preferences. Moreover, with the advent of
genetic engineering we can deliberately manipulate the DNA of plants and animals
itself, thus directing the variation even more. But even so, guided variation will not
automatically save us from time-consuming sieving process. So despite all intentions
and manipulations, artificial selection still is a special instance of Darwinian
evolution.
But there are more ways to restore the analogy between biological and cultural
evolution. In general, one could either argue that biological variation is blind but that
cultural variation is blind as well, or reversely one could argue that cultural variation
is guided but that biological variation is guided as well. The first line of argument is
employed by Campbell (1960, 1974b); Munz (1993); Popper (1972); Cziko (1995)
and Hull (1988, 2001) amongst others.45 They argue that cultural (and scientific)
variation only appears to be guided because, for convenience sake, we quickly tend
to forget all those variants which for some reason or other failed to survive. We
should not forget that for every successful idea many other ideas have quietly
perished. So cultural evolution can be made to look directional by careful editing. It
is only in retrospect, when all the dead ends, failures and false steps are blotted out,
that we get the impression that variation is guided. And even if variation were biased
or constrained somehow, the directedness would itself be the product of earlier
selection processes. So at bottom real creative evolution always involves fumbling
in the dark.46 Cultural variation is therefore much blinder than people commonly
believe. It is blind, random or ‘unjustified’ in the sense that we never can predict in
advance whether a particular variant will be retained or not. We will always need the
hindsight of a selective system to separate the wheat from the chaff. So it is not true
that we can actively seek out the variants and inventions that are needed. If that really
were the case we already would have found a cure for cancer or a solution to the
threat of global warming, etc., a long time ago. Of course nobody denies that cultural
evolution usually involves conscious and intelligent agents. But again, the fact that
much of culture is consciously and deliberately generated does not guarantee that it
will be selectively retained. So the fact that a cultural variant is created intentionally is
not a sufficient condition for that variant’s success, and indeed it might not be a
necessary condition either because some cultural variants, like certain rumors, cus-
toms, or pronunciations, etc., are not deliberately generated – they just crop up – but
nevertheless may turn out to be highly successful.
But why do people choose one cultural variant rather than another? In the previous
section we already saw that a variant – a meme – may for instance increase its
frequency over time due to its intrinsic attractiveness. Technically this is called
45 For a critical comment on this line of argument see Kronfeldner (2010).
46 As Campbell (1974b, p. 147) put it: ‘[I]ncreasing knowledge or adaptation of necessity involves
exploring the unknown, going beyond existing knowledge and adaptive recipes. This of necessity involves
unknowing, non-preadapted fumbling in the dark.’ See also Mesoudi (2008).
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‘content bias’, i.e., the content of an idea or practice affects its probability of being
transmitted. But there are of course many more ways in which selection and trans-
mission can be biased. Let me briefly address two other types here. A second type of
transmission bias is called ‘frequency-dependent bias’. This involves using the
frequency of a trait as a guide as to whether to adopt it, irrespective of its content.
Richerson and Boyd (2005) demonstrate that frequency-dependent bias may result in
conformity, i.e., when individuals imitate the most common behavior in the popula-
tion; or in nonconformity, i.e., when individuals imitate the least common behavior in
the population. Conformity – When in Rome, do as the Romans do – offers an
explanation for long-lasting cultural traditions, even when migration numbers are
high. A third type of transmission bias is called ‘model-based bias’ or ‘prestige bias’.
Here the identity of the person from whom the cultural variant is acquired affects the
variant’s success. Prestige bias might not be a bad strategy because by imitating the
behavior of successful individuals in the population, you have a chance to become
successful yourself. Studies in dialect evolution also support this hypothesis.
According to Richerson and Boyd (2005) locally prestigious women tend to be the
most advanced speakers of evolving dialects, and popular adolescent girls of the
lower middle class are usually the most important leaders of urban language
evolution.47
Now let us return to the issue of guided variation. So far I have shown that (i)
cultural variation is more blind and therefore less guided than people commonly
believe; and (ii) that even if variation were guided, this would not undermine my
central claim that cultural evolution is Darwinian, because cumulative selection – and
not random variation – is the key feature of Darwinian evolution. But as pointed out
above, there also is another way to resolve the issue of guided variation. One could
argue that cultural variation indeed is guided, but that biological variation is guided as
well. This line of argument is employed by Richards (1981); Dawkins (1986);
Wimsatt and Schank (1988); Stein and Lipton (1989) and Kantorovich (1993)
amongst others. Their argument boils down to the claim that evolution inevitably
puts constraints on both biological and cultural variation. Cultural variation, as we
just saw, is random or blind in the sense that we cannot predict in advance whether a
variant will survive or not. But obviously, cultural variation is not random or blind in
the sense that selection operates on all conceivable variants logically possible.
Cultural variation is constrained by tradition, the spirit of the age, the prevailing
worldview, and possibly even by innate propensities. So cultural variation is surely
guided in this sense, but this will not undermine the analogy with biological variation
because we encounter similar constraints in the biological realm. Biological-genetic
variation is constrained by a species’ evolutionary history, the constitution of its
genotype, and the laws of molecular biology. It is important in this context to realize
that constraints are not mere drawbacks which obstruct evolution. On the contrary,
constraints channel the variation and by directing it produce much deeper exploration
than would otherwise be possible. As Wimsatt & Schank write: ‘Constraints can thus
play a creative and, in one sense, ultimately progressive role. This is a deep truth, not
only about evolution, but about problem-solving and exploration in general.’48 Note
47 Richerson and Boyd (2005), p. 125.
48 Wimsatt and Schank (1988), p. 235.
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incidentally that the two lines of argument discussed above are perfectly compatible.
Cultural variation can both be blind (in the sense of unjustified) and guided (in the
sense of constrained). More in general, both genetic and cultural variation is blind
with respect to the problems they have to solve: an ensuing selection process is
needed to find out whether some variants are useful or not. But neither genetic
variation nor cultural variation is truly random in the sense that they are completely
unbiased. It therefore seems that the analogy still holds.
But we still have to address the second main objection raised against the idea of
Darwinian cultural evolution. This objection amounts to the claim that cultural (and
technological-scientific) evolution cannot possibly be Darwinian because its trans-
mission system is essentially Lamarckian. Lamarckian inheritance means that ac-
quired characters (phenotypic changes) are heritable and thus can be transmitted to an
individual’s offspring. Lamarckian evolution is therefore swift and progressive: it
does not need a laborious and time-consuming Darwinian sieving process which
selects, retains and accumulates the rare useful variants. In Lamarckian evolution the
variations that occur are already pre-adapted and adjusted to the needs and wants they
have to fulfill. As Gould (1996) put it:
[C]ultural change [..] is Lamarckian in basic mechanism. Any cultural knowl-
edge acquired in one generation can be directly passed to the next by what we
call, in a most noble word, education. [..] This uniquely and distinctively
Lamarckian style of human cultural inheritance gives our technological history
a directional and cumulative character that no natural Darwinian evolution can
possess.49
Now of course it is true that we can hand down ideas, practices and skills, etc., to
future generations. But to call this process ‘Lamarckian’ may be somewhat mislead-
ing. As Hull (1988) already pointed out, if cultural evolution were Lamarckian in a
literal sense, the ideas, practices and skills, etc., that we acquire during our lifetime
should somehow become encoded into one’s DNA and then be genetically transmit-
ted to one’s offspring. Obviously, that is not what Gould and other critics have in
mind. They believe that cultural evolution is Lamarckian in a metaphorical sense, i.e.,
ideas, practices and skills, etc., should be viewed as the analogues or counterparts of
genes. Just as genes are transmitted to one’s biological offspring, so too are memes
transmitted to one’s cultural ‘offspring’. It is important to distinguish these two
different types of inheritance because, as we have seen, cultural evolution is propelled
by its own Darwinian algorithm of variation, selection and replication. The crucial
point is that in both the biological and cultural realm variation is subjected to
cumulative selection, a process which – in both realms – will result in perplexing
instances of adaptation. As a renowned biologist and paleontologist Gould should
have known that of all dynamic processes, Darwinian cumulative evolution is capable
of such feats of design. With Hull one therefore suspects that authors who claim that
cultural evolution is Lamarckian actually have a caricatured sense of the term in
mind, i.e., they want to underline that cultural evolution is intentional. But we have
already seen that the intentional character of cultural evolution will not save us from a
genuine trial and error pursuit. The complex cultural adaptations and designs result
49 Gould (1996), p. 222.
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from indirect Darwinian selection rather than direct Lamarckian instruction. It is only
in retrospect that successful cultural variations seem miraculously guided, pre-
adapted and premeditated. So cultural evolution may be as intentional as can be
imagined, but it is not entirely clear what we would gain by calling it ‘Lamarckian’.
Nevertheless, in the contemporary literature terms like ‘guided variation’ and
‘Lamarckian inheritance’ are still used albeit not in a strict or literal sense. For instance,
in the mathematical models of Boyd and Richerson (1985) ‘guided variation’ is a
technical term which refers to a mode of transmission in which one individual acquires
information from a second individual, and then modifies that information according to
his own individual learning processes. This modified information then can be transmit-
ted to other individuals in the population. Here cultural variation is guided by individual
experience and the mode of transmission is to a certain extent – i.e., in a metaphorical
sense – Lamarckian. As Mesoudi (2011) rightly argues, it is in this sense that cultural
evolution can be said to be directed and not blind. But he also stresses the fact that
despite these alleged Lamarckian flavors, the basic assumption in most current models
of cultural evolution is that all instances of complex cultural design are the result of
Darwinian cumulative sieving processes. Not foresighted variation but hindsighted
selection is the secret to creative Darwinian evolution.
Conclusion
Let me wrap up the strands of my argument. What I have tried to show in this article
is that a case for Darwinian cultural evolution can be made. The claim that culture
evolves is not a loose metaphor or mere figure of speech but should be taken quite
seriously because cultural evolution generally obeys the same fundamental
Darwinian principles as biological evolution. Both instances of evolution are gov-
erned by what I called Darwin’s formula: the algorithm of variation, selection, and
replication. Together the three elements result in a process of cumulative selection,
which is the essential and defining ingredient of Darwinian evolution. Cumulative
selection is responsible for the perplexing instances of adaptation and design, both in
the biological and the cultural realm. Many aspects of human culture are much too
complex to emerge in a single step or to be thought up by an individual human being.
Instead these achievements must have been gradually accumulated during a long and
historical sieving process in which small adjustments and improvements were selec-
tively retained. We have seen that, so far, only the culture of Homo sapiens exhibits
this typical cumulative character. Through cumulative culture human beings have
constructed a completely novel environment – a cultural niche – which, with regard to
complexity and design, easily surpasses anything conjured up by earlier hominids or
by any extant primate species. Niche construction, although not uniquely human,
played a special role in human evolution because it triggered a complex interaction
between cultural and biological evolution. Genes and culture co-evolve, as for
instance is demonstrated by the remarkable increase of the hominid brain during
the last 3 Ma. Without such cultural innovations as tool use, control of fire, cooking
food and eating meat, our ancestors would never have developed bigger brains simply
because the appropriate cultural niche was absent. Thus culture changed our genes
and thereby the path of human evolution.
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I also demonstrated that culture, although constrained by elementary biological
imperatives, has its own evolutionary dynamics. Culture has brought about its own
variation-selection-and-replication mode through which information is passed to next
generations. Culture evolves because Darwin’s formula is substrate-neutral, i.e., in
principle any dynamic system could evolve according to Darwinian principles as long
as the three necessary ingredients are present. As we have seen, in the case of human
culture this condition is met. So sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists are
wrong in thinking that human culture wholly takes place within, and therefore can
somehow be reduced to, the more fundamental framework of biological evolution.
Sometimes culture simply breaks loose from its leash and evolves in its own right.
Memetics has picked up this important point, but the alleged strong analogy between
genes and memes may be flawed because in some aspects memes are probably very
different from genes. So cultural evolution might be a different example of the same
type of Darwinian process rather than a simple analogue of it. Future empirical
research might settle this matter.
Another alleged disanalogy between biological and cultural evolution concerns the
supposed Lamarckian character of cultural evolution. I believe that I have demon-
strated that cultural evolution is ‘Lamarckian’ only in some caricaturized sense, i.e.,
as being purposive and intentional. The impression that cultural evolution is directed
– and that cultural variation seems to be guided – arises only in retrospect when we
have rubbed out the many mistakes and false starts. Despite all goal-directedness
cultural (and scientific) evolution remains essentially Darwinian because humans are
fallible creatures: our greatest collective achievements are not due to some mysterious
foresight but to the hindsight of a cumulative winnowing process. In sum, although
there are obvious differences between biological and cultural evolution, they also
have something very fundamental in common since in both processes the same
Darwinian logic applies: we try to understand which processes cause some variants
to increase in the population and other variants to dwindle. The idea is that when we
understand these micro-evolutionary causes, we can try to make predictions about
their large-scale and long-term macro-evolutionary effects, predictions which can
then be tested in models, and maybe in the real world as well. The science of cultural
evolution will then become truly explanatory.
Some adherents of the research program, like Distin (2011) and Mesoudi (2011),
go even further. They believe that we are on the eve of a major conceptual break-
through. That is, they believe that the study of cultural evolution will help to unify the
currently still fractionated social sciences in the same way as evolutionary theory has
unified the biological sciences in the 1930s and 1940s.50 The idea of Darwinian
cultural evolution thus will provide a common and unifying framework for the social,
psychological, behavioral, and economic sciences, disciplines which are currently
still divided by different assumptions, approaches and methodologies. Diverse cul-
tural phenomena can then be understood in terms of a handful of common underlying
principles and processes. The future will tell whether this promise will be redeemed.
What we know at present is that we humans are shaped by Darwinian selection
processes, both biological and cultural. The intricate interplay between these two
kinds of evolution has resulted in the emergence of a remarkable species of primate
50 See also Mesoudi et al. (2006).
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who has made the transmission and accumulation of cultural information his trade-
mark. From the most casual examples of local folklore to the highest and most sacred
instances of human civilization: they all result from the same indefatigable sieving
process which dates back at least 3 Ma to our first tool-using ancestors. Since then
cultural evolution has never stopped. It is a fascinating thought that cumulative
selection processes occur everywhere around us, all the time, and that we are cast
in that magnificent play.
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